Sunday, March 24, 2019

Remilitarization of the Rhineland :: essays research papers

Question 2323.     With dictators, nonhing succeeds like success. That observation, by Adolf Hitler, is not as trite as it sounds. Hitler was referring to his own successful remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936. in the beginning he moved into the Rhineland, Hitler was securely "in his box". Pursuant to the Versailles conformity and the Locarno pact of 1926, Germany had been forced to keep this territory demilitarized as a procure against renewed aggression futhermore, an unguarded Rhineland left Germany naked to a French attack. From the German point of view, this was not "fair" it violated German sovereignty. besides it was the price Germany paid for invading France and the low countries in 1914. And it was the lid on the box that contained Hitlers grand strategic ambition.      In March of 1936 Hitler decided to put the dice and take an extremely perilous venture (Goff. 235). Hitlers reason for move into the Rhinland was a ratification one month earlier of a plebeian assistance pact between France and Russia that he felt was aimed at Germany (Medlicott 84-90, 110). Hitler cited the interchangeable non-aggresion pact as violating and therefore invalidating the Locarno Treaty (Winton 1). Hitler was weak. Germany was still essay through the Depression and Germanys armed forces were still in pitiful shape, dispiritedly outgunned by the French. Had the French army responded in force to the remilitarization, had it simply marched into the Rhineland, Hitler would get hold of had to retreat. Hitler later declared "If the French had then marched into the Rhineland, we would keep had to withdraw with our dog between our legs" (Goff 236). A retreat on the German part would have signified collapse, possibly the collapse of Hitlers rule. However, Hitler felt the French would be loath and not act upon his move...and he was right.     The militarization of the Rhineland was a direct vitamin C to French security. It rendered worthless the promises of military aid by France to her eastern European allies Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania if any of them were attacked by Germany (Medlicott 84-90, 110) .There were numerous reasons why France and Great Britain did not retaliate, but the most prevalent are as follows                1. a substantial hatred for war by those who remembered WWI. This was accompinied           by a non-enthusiastic attitude toward strained military spending.                          2. a, perhaps, repentful attitude by Britain toward Germany because they felt they           were dealt with too harshly at Versailles therefore their desire for revision was       &nb sp        understandable.

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